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COMMENTS
DAMAGES-COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTINE--DEDuCTIBILITY OF SOoAL
SECURITY BENEFITS IN MITIGATION OF DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF EMPLOYIENT CONTRACT
Utced Protective Workers r. Ford Motor Co., 220 F2d 49
(7th Cr. 1955)
While employed by defendant Ford Motor Company, plaintiff elected
tW participate in a company annuity plan. Unknown to plaintiff, the
plan provided for compulsory retirement at age sixty-five. When,
pursuant to the terms of the plan, the company retired plaintiff solely
because of age, plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, con-
tending that defendant's action had violated a company-union collec-
tive bargaining agreement which provided that employees could not
be discharged without cause. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the judgment entered below for plaintiff, but modi-
fied the lower court's computation of damages, holding that defendant
should be permitted to deduct from the total award amounts received
by plaintiff as social security benefits during the remainder of the
term of the emplo.yment contract.1
The traditional common-law basis for computing damages for
breach of contract has been to compensate for losses flowing from the
breach,- i. e., to place a plaintiff in as good a position as he would have
been in had he been allowed to complete the contract? Thus, in keep-
ing vith the compensatory theory, the common-law rule for the mea-
sure of damages for breach of an employment contract has required
a deduction of the employee's net earnings from other sources during
the remainder of the term of the contract from the amount he would
have received had there been no breach.4 In those instances where
the employee has had no earnings during the remainder of the contract
term, the judgment will be reduced by the amount he would have been
able to earn through the exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking
other employment.5 Similarly, the measure of damages in tort actions
has also been stated to be based upon compensatory principles," but
under a well established exception-the collateral source doctrine-a
tortfeasor will not be allowed to deduct in mitigation of damages
I Jnitvd Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955).
N\ twy otbe interesting questions appear in the case, this comment will be re-
st cPA to consideration of the measure of damages. The facts have been stated
xk o h this end in view.
2. Sehlottman v. Pressev, 195 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1952); Blair v. United
Sltates, I50 F.2d 676 (8th Cr. 1945).
l Baer Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Palmer, 158 F2d 278, 280 (l0th Cir. 1946);
:W WILLISTON, CONTnwTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937).
1 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941); Republic Steel(G-t p v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); 5 WLrSTox, CONTRACTS § 1358 (rev. ed.
223 F.d at 52; Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 136 F.2d 981 (10th Ot. 1943).
t; MeConnici, DxuAoEs § 1.37 (1935); Puosn, Torts § 2 (2d ed. 1955).
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benefits received by a plaintiff from a collateral source.7 Thus, the
question presented by the principal case is whether the collateral
source doctrine should be extended to an action for breach of contract
so as to preclude defendant from mitigating damages by deducting
from the total award payments received by plaintiff as a result of
social welfare legislation.
The basis for application of the collateral source doctrine in tort
actions is that a tortfeasor should not be allowed to escape the con-
sequences of his wrongful acts merely because his victim has received
a benefit from a collateral source.8 A tort action usually involves fault
of some kind, and, because of this, it is not surprising that the col-
lateral source doctrine, with its punitive overtones,9 should have come
into existence as an exception to the compensatory theory. On the
other hand, the measure of damages for breach of the ordinary
commercial contract has been developed so as to avoid the often futile
determination of the degree of moral obliquity of the party who has
breached." For this reason the collateral source doctrine has not
generally been extended to actions for breach of contract.1
In the principal case, the court was presented with the argument
that the collateral source doctrine should be extended to a contract
action because of the asserted authority of a line of cases involving
the power of the NLRB to issue orders disallowing deduction of col-
lateral benefits from back-pay awards to wrongfully discharged em-
ployees. 2 It is to be noted, however, that under the NLRA,13 the
7. E.g., NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co. 129 F.2d 169, 172 (7th Cir. 1942);
United States v. Shipowners & Merchants Tugboat Co., 103 F. Supp. 152 (N.D.
Cal. 1952); RESTATEMIENT, TORTS § 920, comment e (1939). See generally, Note,
1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 453.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. See Note, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 453.
10. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1951).
11. 223 F.2d at 54.
It is interesting to note that, in those cases where the collateral source doctrine
has been extended to employment contract actions, the courts have rejected con-
tentions that, because tax rates are based upon the employer's unemployment
experience record, unemployment compensation benefits are direct benefits from
the employer rather than from a collateral source. NLRB v. Marshall Field &
Co., 129 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1942); see also NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S.
361 (1951); Bang v. International Sisal Co., 212 Minn. 135, 4 N.W.2d (1942).
This reasoning simply refuses to trace the source of the benefits any further
than the fund maintained by the state through taxes. Ibid. "How the State
raise[s] the funds is a matter between the State and its taxpayers." NLRB v.
Marshall Field & Co., supra at 173.
If a jurisdiction should adopt the position taken by the principal case and
refuse to extend the collateral source doctrine, the foregoing reasoning could be
applied to reject an argument by the employee that at least the amounts received
from the social welfare fund which are attributable to taxes paid by him should
not be deducted, since there is no logical basis of distinction between tracing the
employee's taxes and tracing the taxes of the employer. It is conceded, however,
that a court might cdnclude that since the purpose of the welfare statute is to
alleviate hardships of the employee, his taxes should be traced so as to preclude
deduction by the employer.
12. The courts have upheld orders by the Board where deductions of collat-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/7
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Board has power to issue such orders as will effectuate the policies of
the act." So broadly has this power been interpreted that it is appar-
ently within the discretion of the Board to change the common-law
measure of damages if such a change could fairly be said to effectuate
the policies of the act."- If this is true, it would appear that the court
in the principal case properly determined that cases involving pro-
ceedings to enforce an order of the NLRB were not controlling in a
common-law action for damages for breach of an employment contract.
The precise question presented by the principal case appears to
have arisen in only two other cases, neither of which was argued
before the instant court or cited in the briefs. In Bang v. International
Sisal Co.1' and in Billetter v. Posellt, which were common-law actions
for breach of employment contracts, it was held that unemployment
eral benefits from back-pay awards were diallowed in cases where the benefits
consisted of groceries received from a labor union while the employee was un-
employtd, see NLRB v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc, 127 F.2d 198 (8th Cit.
1942), or' of unemployment compensation payments, NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,
340 U.S. 361 (1951); NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129 F2d 169 (7th Cir.
1942), afd, 3 18 U.S. 253 (1943).
Under the NLRA, see note 1.3 infra, however, the NLRB has issued orders pur-
'uant to § 10(c), see note 14 infra, both allowing Mannato v. Dutch Sales Co., 14
('CH Lab. Cas. 64,41$ (DN.J. 1948) (unemployment compensation); Hopper
v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 CCH Lab. Cas. 63,404 (NJD. Ala. 1946) (unemploy-
ment compensation), and denying, In the Matter of Walter Stover, 15 N.L2R.B.
635, 6514 n,28 (1939) (unemployment compensation); In the Matter of Oil Well
Mfg. Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1129 n.9 (1939) (work relief project payments),
deductions of benefits received from government social welfare agencies. Since
Congress has reenacted the pertinent parts of § 10(c) without change, it has
tndicated its approval of the Board's interpretation of its discretion under the
secton, NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., sqpra.
1:'. 49 SrT . 449 (1935), as amended, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
29 U-S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
14. Secttin 10(c) provides that the Board may issue cease and desist orders
to stop unfair labor practices "and to take such affirmative action including re-
instatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
,f th s Act .... " 49 STAT. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
1, See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943), quoted
in Eichleay ($rp. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1953). In addition to
congressional acquiescence in the Boaxd's interpretation of its power, see note
12 . upra, this proposition is also strongly suported by NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottliog Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953). In that case the Board bad devised a back-pay
computation scheme on a quarterly basis whereby the employee's earnings in one
quarter would have no effect upon back-pay liability for other quarters. The
Roai 4 gave as its reasons for the scheme that where a wrongfuly discharged
employee obtained a higher paying job, it was to the employer's advantage to
delay an offer of reinstatement as long as possible, since the more time the em-
ployee spent at the new job, the greater the back-pay liability was reduced. Since
the employee could terminate the running of back pay and prevent further reduc-
ton of the amount due him as damages by a waiver of his right to reinstatement,
he had a great incentive to do so. The Board determined that these practices were
ontra ry to the policies of the act and therefore introduced the new method of
crmputation. The Supreme Court held that this scheme was within the dis-
cretion of the Board under § 10(c). Since the common-law rule required deduc-
ion of the employee's earnings from his measure of damages, see text supported
by note 4 .epra, it would seem clear that, in effect, the Seven-Up case holds that
the NLRB has power under § 10(c) to change the common-law measure of
damages if such a change can reasonably be said to effectuate a policy of the act.
16. 212 Minn. 135, 4 N.W.2d 113 (1942).
17. 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d 621 (1949).
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compensation benefits are not deductible in mitigation of damages.
The reasoning of these cases recognizes that the purpose of unem-
ployment compensation benefits is to alleviate distresses of unem-
ployment,"" and not to relieve employers of amounts to be paid as
damages. Therefore it would seem that although a plaintiff should not
be made more than whole,"9 his employer should not be allowed to place
the burden of his breach" of contract upon the unemployment compen-
sation fund.20 This reasoning could as well be applied to social se-
curity benefits. 2 1 The purpose of these benefits is to alleviate financial
difficulties resulting from the inability of many aged persons to earn
a living.22 This purpose would appear to be complemented by a policy
encouraging continued employment of elderly worlnen for as long
as it is practicable for them to work. Such a policy would be defeated
if the employer is allowed to place the burden of his breaches of con-
tract upon the social security fund.
The solution to the problem whether mitigation should be allowed
depends upon a reconciliation of the compensatory theory of dam-
ages 23 with the policies of the social welfare program. 24 It has been
proposed that, in order to preserve the compensation theory and at
the same time give effect to the policies of the welfare statutes, a
theory of subrogation or reimbursement of the government agency
be adopted.25 Thus, the amount received by the employee as social
security benefits would be deducted from his measure of damages and
paid by the employer to the government agency administering the
program. This proposed solver of the problem appears to coincide
with the purposes of the law and should be adopted. Society can have
its cake and eat it too. Whether this may be accomplished by court
decision is perhaps another problem, 2 but if the courts cannot pres-
ently effect such a scheme, then legislative authorization is indicated.
18. Many of the unemployment compensation acts have similar statements of
public policy. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. c. 48, § 300 (1955).
19. 223 F.2d at 53; .5 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937).
20. See notes 16 & 17 supra; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 14
(1940) (dissenting opinion); see also 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 100 (1939).
21. While it is realized that certain administrative differences as to eligibility
for benefits exist between the social security system and the unemployment com-
pensation programs, it is nevertheless submitted that the same policy considera-
tions are applicable to each.
22. See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364 (1946); Helver-
ing v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
23. See text supported by notes 2-6 supra.
24. See notes 18 & 22 supra and text supported thereby.
25. Note, 63 HAv. L. REV. 330 337 (1949).
26. In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), the Supreme Court
refused to enforce a back-pay order of the Board which not only directed deduc-
tion of work relief project payments but also directed the amount deducted to
be paid to the relief project agency. The Court said that the Board is without
power to impose a penalty upon the employer. But the vitality of this case
seems to have been greatly diminished by NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S.
361 (1951) where it was held that the Board had power to prohibit entirely the
deduction of unemployment compensation benefits.
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